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The most influential and arguably the most robust characterization of modernity is
famously provided by Foucault’s Qu’est-ce que les Lumie`res? his text on Kant’s
idea of the Enlightenment. The essence of modernity, Foucault suggests, lies in its
taking itself and its own place in history as an object of thought. Modernity is
therefore a form of consciousness and a way of inhabiting the world which is
historically determined. Further, this form of consciousness is characterized by a
focus on eventfulness and on the decisive force of the present: It is our present that
distinguishes us in the whole of the flow of history. In this line of thought, the world
of the modern is a world of qualitative difference and of opportunity, of sequential,
irreversible time, an exit from the ahistorical permanence of pre-modern times.
In his Foundations of the Everyday, Eran Dorfman seems to make the opposite
argument: What characterizes late modernity, he argues, is its close entanglement
with an experience of the everyday, of a time of repetition, habituation and
permanence. However, staying content with such a prima facie contrast between
Foucalt and Dorfman’s views on modernity would miss the subtle and potent crux
of Dorfman’s argument: The fundamental place of the everyday and of the eventful
for modernity are not mutually exclusive but interdependent. The object of
Dorfman’s analysis isn’t eventlessness against eventfulness, but it is their
coexistence and contemporaneity.
Dorfman’s basic question could be formulated in this way: What is the
experience of living in a world in which the everyday exists? But this immediately
involves this other question: What is the existence of the everyday? The everyday’s
mode of existence, Dorfman suggests, is first and foremost conceptual. In
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modernity, the everyday exists as a concept. Yet, as a concept, its existence relies on
those (us, late moderns) who conceive of it, and who use it to describe the world, but
also to guide our own actions and our lives. As a result, the everyday should be seen
as a polarizing force for modern behavior. Here, Dorfman’s kinship with Foucault
surfaces: The everyday became an object of thought precisely against the new self-
understanding of an epoch, modernity, which began regarding itself in contradis-
tinction with the everyday of past history. Thus, the existence of the concept of the
everyday requires precisely a modern condition of the type described by Foucault:
one against which not only the everyday detaches itself by contrast, but even more,
one in which the everyday can be invested with a certain form of (negative) value—
as the repulsive pole of the modern experience.
A true engagement with this deep book therefore requires that we begin with the
way it doubles out the concept of the everyday. Unfortunately, the doubling out is
left implicit by Dorfman (leading to potential confusion) but let us try to clarify it
here. Dorfman uses ‘‘everyday’’ in two senses, the first we might call ‘‘fantastical’’
and the other ‘‘modern.’’ Let me explain how they interact. The fantastical sense of
the everyday is fallacious, it is the idealized sense of a permanent present. It is one
invested with negative connotations of passivity, boredom and connected with our
most natural and animalistic dimensions. The modern sense is the correct one
according to Dorfman: It is the process by which permanent time (the fantastical
sense) leads into eventful time. Note that this makes the ‘‘correct’’ notion of the
modern everyday deeply connected to a sense of ambiguity: Our everyday, Dorfman
suggests, is spent neither in the fantastical everyday, nor in eventfulness, but in an
in-between space structured by the repulsion towards the former and the projection
towards the latter, a projection that endlessly fails (making any idealized notion of
eventful time just as fantastical as the false idea of the everyday). This distinction
involves a complex relation between the fantastical and the modern sense of the
everyday: On the one hand, the fantastical everyday is false, but on the other hand it
is necessary to understand the modern one. And its necessity is double:
First, its existence in the modern mental world has causal importance for our
behavior. As the repulsive pole of our action, it structures our action: we will do
anything to avoid the everyday. This is why such a concept of the everyday is
literally fantastical: it is a fantasy, i.e.: a falsity that polarizes our behavior, it is
false but not causally innocuous.
Secondly, the fantastical concept of the everyday is necessary to Dorfman
himself. That is to say, it is necessary to whomever wishes to describe how the
modern self’s obsessive wish to avoid falling into the everyday of their fantasy
thereby constitutes another, specifically modern experience of the everyday: our
everyday is structured by our avoidance of the everyday. The account of the
genuine notion of the everyday is premised on the false one. Dorfman thus comes
to an analysis of the everyday no longer as this that the eventful [or as he
sometimes simply says: ‘‘experience’’ (1)] rejects and escapes but precisely as
this that connects the fear of boredom with the striving for newness: the modern
everyday is the process by which the eventful rejects the permanent, and
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modernity becomes now refined not against Foucault, but alongside and beyond
him. Modernity is the theater in which the interaction of two fantasies (that of
permanent and eventful time) plays itself out in the soul of the modern subject.
For Dorfman, like Kant and Foucault, sees modernity as the period in history
where the way we spend our time is invested with value: if modernity regards
itself as a historical opportunity, modern times are haunted with the fear of
missing this opportunity or as we moderns call it: the fear of wasting our time.
So, if Dorfman’s book indeed truly analyses the ‘‘foundations of the everyday,’’
we must pay close attention to the meaning of ‘‘of’’: Dorfman is not investigating
what makes the everyday what it is or what grounds it. Rather, he is drawing out
how the everyday offers foundations for the modern existential predicament. He
begins by declaring: ‘‘I propose the notion of foundation to capture the way the
everyday functions. The everyday as a foundation is the background against which
any significant activity occurs.’’ (1–2, italic mine). So it seems that the everyday is
the foundation of meaningfulness. Whether this foundation is conceptual (making
the concept of the everyday necessary to the concept of meaning), existential
(making the experience of the everyday necessary for the experience of meaning),
or metaphysical (making the existence of repetitive time necessary to the existence
of eventful time) is addressed—more or less directly—by appeal to the notions
presented in the subtitle, those of ‘‘shock,’’ ‘‘deferral’’ and ‘‘repetition.’’ Together,
these three operations characterize the everyday as the process through which the
repulsion from the fantasized everyday throws the modern soul into a search for an
equally fantastical ‘‘experience’’ or eventfulness.
By shock, Dorfman means what many readers are familiar with as ‘‘events’’: A
shock is ‘‘every action or event that attempts to go ‘outside’ the global movement of
the everyday.’’ (3) It is a break (or an attempted break) in the fantasized linearity of
the fantasized everyday. Naturally, this notion of shock involves a suspension of
‘‘the global movement of the everyday.’’ It is this suspension Dorfman terms
‘‘deferral,’’ i.e., the deferral of the fantasized everyday, a deferral which comes to
characterize the modern everyday. In this context, repetition is the return of the
‘‘global movement of the everyday,’’ its resumption after the interruption of shock
and the deferral that followed. (3–4) This tri-partite structure is the core of the ‘‘late
modern’’ experience of the everyday, now recognized as the experience of
interruption. Although this proto-phenomenological account will probably invite
controversy, let us remark immediately how quickly and directly it applies to the
prosaic modern experience of stress, that is, of constant interruption. This is but one
example of Dorfman’s ability to surprise the reader with strikingly concrete
implications of many of his more abstract discussions.
Thus, Dorfman’s argument relies on six basic notions namely, the three explicit
notions of shock, deferral, and repetition and the three implicit ones of ‘‘fantastical
everyday,’’ ‘‘modern’’ everyday and of a ‘‘fantastical eventfulness’’ named
‘‘experience. Nonetheless, Dorfman’s argument is presented under a historical
rather than systematic form. Chapters 1 and 2 investigate (and discard) the
phenomenological contributions to the question of the everyday (in Husserl and
Heidegger for Chapter 1, and in Merleau-Ponty for Chapter 2) before moving to
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Freud (Chapter 3), and to Benjamin (Chapter 4 and 5). Let me take them in turn,
briefly.
Dorfman’s engagement with phenomenology is designed to turn the notion of the
everyday against it. The everyday, Dorfman contends, is an experience that
phenomenology—the self-proclaimed science of experience—fails to account for.
This is because directly or indirectly, phenomenology buys into the fantasy of
authenticity, and therefore fails to acknowledge the ambiguous status of the
experience of the everyday. Dorfman declares that ‘‘all three phenomenologists
[Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty] finally abandon the everyday in favor of a
sphere of authenticity or full experience, a sphere in relation to which the everyday
can be nothing but an inauthentic shadow.’’ (90)
Dorfman begins by correctly locating the encounter of phenomenology with the
everyday at the very beginning, that is to say, in the Husserlian theme of the
phenomenological reduction. He notes two points of convergence between the
Husserlian gesture and his own. First, the theme of the reduction involves an
interruption—akin to Dorfman’s own ‘‘shock’’—which is known as ‘‘suspension’’ in
the phenomenological language. Secondly, it involves a defiant stance towards the
fantasized everyday (the ‘‘natural attitude’’ in Husserl’s language). However,
Dorfman points out that in Husserl, the (eidetic) reduction provides essences that
come forward as ‘‘pure’’ events abstracted from their atmosphere of everydayness.
This brings Husserlian phenomenology (Dorfman‘s Husserl is a transcendental
idealist) very close to the fantasy of pure everydayness and pure eventfulness. All of
this is all-too-pure for the everyday. As a result Dorfman finds that the core of his
own view is precisely what phenomenology cannot account for: the fact that this
fantasized everyday is precisely only a fantasy, and the fact that such essences are
not truly events. Dorfman concludes that phenomenology cannot account for the
constant projection of the fantasized everyday into a fantasized eventfulness, a
projection that is the modern everyday itself, for this projection is neither authentic
nor inauthentic, but is the continuity that moves from the fantastical inauthentic
(pure everyday) to the fantastical authentic (pure eventfulness). Although it was
introduced against Husserl, Dorfman’s line of argument informs his reading of
Heidegger too: Heideggerian authenticity is a fantastical eventfulness.
Even if one grants Dorfman’s controversial account of Husserl and Heidegger,
the reader is naturally compelled to look to Merleau-Ponty for a solution to the
problem of the mutual exclusion of the authentic and the inauthentic in Heidegger
and of the reduced attitude and the natural attitude in Husserl. After all, Merleau-
Ponty’s objection to Sartre takes its inspiration precisely from the need to account
for the experience of ambiguity, from the realization that any ‘‘pure’’ experience is a
contradiction and that the only authentic philosophy is a philosophy of inauthen-
ticity. Precisely because Merleau-Ponty famously declared in the preface of the
Phenomenology of Perception that ‘‘The most important lesson which the reduction
teaches us it the impossibility of a complete reduction,’’ one would be tempted to
see in him the phenomenologist not of the opposition but of the continuity of the
everyday and the event (a continuity Merleau-Ponty went on to call sedimentation)
as well as the theorist of the continuity between the natural attitude and the reduced
attitude. Although he implicitly recognizes that the case of Merleau-Ponty needs
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contending with seriously, Dorfman seems unfazed by the objection. He takes note
of Merleau-Ponty’s ambition of overcoming these oppositions with subtle accounts
of continuity; but he argues that the Phenomenology of Perception fails to achieve
it. On the contrary, he suggests, Merleau-Ponty is finally committed to a full,
authentic notion of experience. This is because Dorfman’s concept of the everyday
poses, he contends, a set of requirements that exceeds those posed by Merleau-
Ponty himself. While Merleau-Ponty’s purpose was to establish the possibility of
the appearance of a world, Dorfman’s demand is for an account of a first-person
experience in a historically determined situation: the psychological experience of
the everyday in late modernity. Dorfman suggests that Merleau-Ponty’s ontological
route implies the loss of the psychological self within the undifferentiated ocean of
being, and thereby amounts to a return to some sort of authenticity conceived as the
harmony between the self and being as a whole (69). Phenomenology, Dorfman
concludes, ignores the historical situation of the modern self alongside the personal
character of the experience of ambiguity that supports the experience of the
everyday.
The emphasis on the alleged lack of any first-person psychological dimension of
the Merleau-Pontian notion of ambiguity throws Dorfman into the arms of Freud
and his ‘‘notion of the psychic apparatus as a defensive mechanism in a hostile yet
seductive everyday environment.’’ (97) That is to say, Freud regards the interaction
of the psychic apparatus and the everyday as structured exactly by the same three
instances as Dorfman, namely, shock (hostility), deferral (defense) and repetition
(seduction). Dorfman’s analysis of Freud’s evolution on the question of trauma and
its implications for the question of deferral and the everyday is subtle, original and
rich and leads into a fascinating parallel between Dorfman’s own account of the
ambiguity of the everyday and Freud’s account of the ambiguous relation of the
child and the adult (119–123). In the child’s ‘‘pre-modern’’ everyday (120) Dorfman
argues, the opposition of event, repetition and permanence is absent. This mode of
being involves a certain mode of traumatizability, in which trauma leads to
repetitive game-playing in the child, whereas it leads to repetitive compulsion in
‘‘modern’’ adults (122). Despite Dorfman’s sympathies for the Freudian model,
Freud misses the important existential point, namely that the type of the child and
the type of the adult thus construed are mere fantasies themselves. The empirical
subject indeed is a mixture of child and adult, and this leads Freud into
‘‘contradictions and entanglements’’ when he tries to account for this coexistence.
(123)
The last hope of finding a stable philosophy of ambiguity for Dorfman is in the
work of Benjamin. Dorfman’s careful investigation of Benjamin’s analysis of mass
production focuses first on the dialectic of mass-production (Chapter 4) and then on
the aura (Chapter 5). The takeway there is that although Benjamin’s idea that
modernity (and especially industrialized modernity) involved a fundamental upset
in the relations between material and auratic presence is correct, Benjamin did not
go far enough in investigating how these two modes of presence could be
reconfigured in late modernity towards a re-auratization of the everyday. According
to Dorfman, we must recognize that auratic presence can be restored to the
everyday: What becomes auraticized is precisely this late-modern striving to evade
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a fantastical repulsive pole of everydayness towards the attractive (and equally
fantastical) pole of ‘‘experience.’’ The final section of Chapter 5, in which Dorfman
focuses on the work of artist Cindy Sherman, makes a delicious point about the self-
understanding of modernity as a constantly failed effort at turning our very everyday
existence onto icons. (173–181)
By now, it may be clear to the reader that Dorfman’s book has a range, a depth of
inspiration and a multilayered quality that forcefully demands our attention. It is a
subtle investigation of our current predicament, one which solidly resists the double-
edged sword of romanticism and cynicism. I say ‘‘solidly,’’ because the rejection of
the alternative is grounded here at the deepest ontological level: The eventfulness
which is the object of romanticism and the everyday which is the object of our
cynicism are recognized as mere fantasies. But cultural analysis and an ontology of
history are only two out of the four dimensions of Dorfman’s contribution. The
other two concern his work as a historian of philosophy and a literary and art critic.
Although for reasons of space, I have only mentioned how Dorfman’s analysis
pours out of philosophy stricto sensu into Sherman’s work, the reader will find
elegant and compelling analyses of literary works by Michel Houellebecq and
Margerite Duras, of artworks by Bill Viola, and of Leni Riefenstahl’s famous and
ominous Triumph of the Will (subtly and correctly relocating Nazism within the
romantic worldview) among others.
Of course, such a kaleidoscopic range of interests runs the risk of dazzling the
reader. It is a risk increased by Dorfman’s oft-ambiguous formulations (two of
which have been alluded to: The ‘‘foundations of the everyday’’ are not what founds
the everyday but what the everyday founds, and the analysis of the everyday is not
an analysis of what the everyday is, but an analysis of what a world in which the
concept of the everyday exists should look like). But this didactic lack should only
put off the readers deaf to Dorfman’s invitation to think alongside him, and not after
him. Part of this invitation, it may be apparent by now, is a promise thrown into the
unknown: Dorfman’s book is best read as a negative preparation to a more positive
elaboration of the ontology involved in his concept of the everyday as ambiguity.
Dorfman’s unrelenting challenge issued to the canonical Continental tradition to
think through ambiguity without collapsing into any fantasized notion of
authenticity allows him to make his point negatively, but it also distracts from
the specifically philosophical intention of the book: the project of building an
ontology of ambiguity.
It is also there, in his engagement with the authors that Dorfman’s analysis lends
itself to fiercer criticisms: If I am right to see Dorfman’s book as an appeal to embed
the late-modern condition into an ontology of ambiguity, the criticism addressed in
Chapters 1 and 2 to phenomenology might require a second look—Dorfman
maintains his complaint that this phenomenological ontology is either too
impersonal or too a-historical. One may wish to probe whether this objections is
not self-defeating: Indeed, isn’t the objection itself resting on some sense of
disconnection between the modern and the non-modern, the individual and the
impersonal, and on a strong, implausible (if not inconceivable) and indeed,
fantasized concept of the event called late modernity as a clean break which should
preclude the very ambiguity sought-after? The great merit of Dorfman’s book is to
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be able to account for qualitative-existential differences (such as the difference in
the subjective experience of late modernity) without any breaks: For this experience
is precisely that of a rearrangement of six elements that remain constant. It will be
for the reader to decide whether Dorfman truly breaks away from phenomenology
or furthers its work. In any case, the unprecedentedly sympathetic ear he lends to
the endless little sufferings of the late-modern condition makes his book an
important contribution to our self-understanding, and to the urgent project of
cultural therapy.
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